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1. Currency convertibility
Over the past months, the case for currency convertibility in most current
account transactions appears to have been won in all the smaller nations of
Central and Eastern Europe.` It has been accepted that convertibility will
help to bring a distorted domestic relative price structure more in line with
world prices. The substitution eftects both in production and consumption
that are activated by the move to convertibility of the currency will be
helpful in the transition to a market economy. But, to impose domestic
relative prices that are more in agreement with world market conditions will
inilially impose heavy adjustment costs on consumers and produccrs. The
benefits of more realistic prices do not appear immediately; the costs of
reduced subsidies to consumers and producers hurt directly. For that reason
alone, removal of distortions in relative prices will stimulate strong political
opposition from consumers, workers and managers. A very important
advantage of currency convertibility is that the speed with which domestic
relative prices adjust to conditions in the world market depends less on
domestic political conditions, but is to an extent imposed from abroad.
The other argument from political economy in favor of immediale
convertibility on current account is that the absence of an `economic' market
for foreign exchange implies the continued existence of a political market in
which foreign currency receipts are collected from companies and allocated
to companies (and individuals). Some (small, newly established) companies
may have attractive investment projects but fail to obtain foreign exchange
for vital imports of machinery, as other (large) businesses enjoy the political
'See Gcnberg (1990) for a clear analysis why it makes no sense in the case of the ez-socialist
nations to demand that macrceconomic stabílization is achieved before the step to a convcrtible
currency is taken. See also Greeno and Isard (1991) for a thorough survey of the arguments for
and against quick establishment of convertibility.
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connections that are essential to obtaining foreign exchange. In addition,
firms and individuals will have strong incentives to maintain foreign currency
balances abroad where they cannot be subjected to confiscation or forced
exchange into domestic money at an exchange rate less favourable than the
b!ack market rate. Maintaining administrative control over the foreign
exchange market will perpetuate an uncertain and inefficient set of con-
straints on firms' activities and cause allocative distortions to spread from
the foreign exchange market to the domestic goods and credit markets.2
2. Fixed excl~ange rates or a crswling peg?
Many economists have advocated some form of fixed exchange rates for
the Central and Eastern European nations. Prescriptions vary from Allan H.
Meltzer's1 advocacy of a monetary authority for the Soviet Union along the
lines of the Hong Kong example to proposals to strive towards participation
in the European Monetary System near the end of this decade. A fixed
exchange rate has also been advocated as part of a fiscal-monetary package
to break (incipient) hyper-inllation.
Fixing the exchange rate of a bankrupt economy without substantial gross
international reserves will result in an exchange rate that should deliver
almost instantaneous equilibrium on current account. That exchange rate
will - unavoidably - be severely undervalued by any purchasing power
parity consideration. The actual value of the real exchange rate, however, will
depend, ceteris paribus, on the emphasis the authorities put on maintaining
the fixed exchange rate. The longer the period for which the authorities aim
to continue a particular exchange rate, the lower the exchange rate will move
in the black market just before being fixed by the authorities at that black
market rate. For, the markets will assume continued domestic inflation as
price reform takes place and monetary overhang is reduced. Also, political
pressure during the period of fixation of the exchange rate may lead to
nominal wage increases in the govcrnment sector in order to temporarily
lower the speed of decline in real wages. Finally, fiscal reforms may fail and
the government may have to print money to cover part of its deficit. In order
to maintain a low probability of an imminent devaluation throughout such a
period, the exchange rate must be so low that initially international reserves
will be accumulated through current account surpluses. This, in fact, is what
happened in the Polish case.
An extremely low exchange rate may indeed achieve credibility that it will
be maintained for a protracted period. That by itself does not deliver a
nominal anchor to the economy: in Poland in(lation continued at a 100
2Calvo and Frenkel 11991) usefully analyse the diflicultics in developing credit markets in ex-
socialist nations during the transition lo a market economy.
'See Meltzer (1990), see also Bofinger (1991I and BomholT ( t991I for a critique.
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pe:rcent annual rate after the initial 80 percent jump in average prices after
the currency reform. A long-term fixing o( lhc exchange ratc has significant
costs, as the ablest workers contemplate migration, given the extreme
disparity between domestic and foreign wage levels. With a crawling peg -
fixing the exchange rate for briefer periods - the exchange rate will be able to
depreciate as necessary, avoiding the need for an initial value that is as low
as in the recent Polish case.`
The standard objection to a crawling peg as initial exchange rate system
for the ex-socialist nations is that the economy then needs to derive its
nominal anchor from its own domestic monetary target, but that the demand
for money schedule is too uncertain to make this feasible during the
transition to a market economy: monetary overhang, future price reform,
uncertain trends in real income and wealth, uncertain returns on money
substitutes. The objection secros valid, but there is an alternative. With most
workers employed by the'state, setting a path for nominal wages in the state
sector during the initial period of the rcforms will deliver something akin to
nominal income targeting. This in fact is what the Dutch finance minister,
Pieter Lieftinck, did during the first 6 months after the Dutch currency
reform of July 1945: the government exccuted a wage policy and lhe Central
Bank was instructed to increase the money supply accordingly.s In
December 1945, the monetary overhang had been removed, real income
could be estimated with more accuracy lhan directly after the war, and the
Central Bank moved successfully to a standard monetary policy of steering a
monetary aggregatc.
3. h1onetary reform in the Soviet Union
Two factors make it even more difficult to ofTer some suggestions about
the Soviet Union than to consider the smallcr nations of Central and Eastern
Europe. First, potential conflicts betwcen different nationalities create the real
risk of territoria) contlicts between the different republics, perhaps espccially
in lhc smaller Asian republics where population pressures cause incompatible
demands for scarce water resources. Second, uncertainty about fiscal policy is
an order of magnitude greater than in the smaller countries of Central
Europe: tax rcvenucs are collected at the republican levcl, but military
expenditures and much of thc bureaucracy is currently financed through
'Poland exemplifies the anempt to achieve a credible fix of the ezchange rate for a long
period. See Portes (1991) for analysis of lhe cosls of an excessive imlial devalualion as in lhe
Polish case. Asselain I1991) wriles: 'the level of thc exchange rate may be considcred a weak
poinl of Ihe (Pulah) plrn adopted in autumn 19g9.'
'See Lieftinck (197)): BomholT ( 1991) pafxr summarizes lhis episode.
E.J. Bomhofj, Monetary rejorm in Eastern Europe 4S7
the centre.b The chaotic situation in the fiscal area and large differences in
per capita wealth imply that each different republic is going to implement its
own tax system. This is not to be regretted, as the traditional Hayekian
argument applies that trying different systems during the difficult transition
to a market economy may make more sense than imposing a single system of
taxation from above.
If a single monetary authority tries to serve all republics and at the same
time the republics implement separate fiscal policies, how will such a
common monetary authority implement a monetary reform to end the
current hyperin(lation? Centrifugal political forces will make it difiicult if not
impossible to negotiate the amount of seigniorage to be collected by a single
monetary authority for the Soviet Union, let alone its division over the
different republics. More fundamentally, a monetary reform makes little sense
unless future budget deficits can be covered without recourse to excessive
money creation.' However, the underlying fiscal reforms that are necessary
for a successful monetary reform depend on developmerits in the individual
republics, and these will not be coordinated between the republics but
depend on political conditions in each republic. Under these circumstances
the republics will prefer to maintain monetary autonomy including the right
to alter the exchange rate with the other republics. The total amount of
seigniorage may be less if each republic introduces its own money, because
foreign currency may become even more important for trans-border trade,
but each republic will have full rights over its own revenues from the
creation of money. lf the world community sees negative externalities here,
that would be an argument for fiscal assistance to the republics.e
Prices will have to be liberalized throughout the Soviet Union and real
wages must adapt, but political conditions in each republic will dictate the
speed with which the required decline in real wage costs can be implemented.
Political conditions in some republics will be morc conducive to a rapid fall
in real wage costs; other republics will feel obliged-to move more slowly and
such differences in the speed with which price reform and privatization take
place will have consequences in the ftscal area. Not only will the republics
not be able to agree on a common monetary policy, they will not want to
give up the exchange rate as an instrument for macroeconomic adjustment.
In the meantime, one has to hope that real activity in each republic will
not be disadvantaged by the introduction of separate monies in the republics
and that republics will not be tempted to impose costly restrictions on
"This chaotic state of affairs makes it impossible to produce an aggregate cstimate of the
current budget deficit for thc Soviet Union. A number of 2S Perccnt of GDP has been
mentioned.
'Bruno (1991) dcscribes how Israel and some Latin American countries lost thcir nominal
anchors because of fiscel imhalances in conjunction with (partial) wage indezation.
"Scc Solimano (1991) for an analysis of fiscal assistance by thc league of nations to Cenlral
and Eastcrn Europc in the intcrwar period.
458 E.J. fiurnhufj, ,~(onetury nforrrt in Eustrrn E:wupr
interrepublican trade. Transaction costs will unavoidably increase temporar-
ily as economic agents have to learn to use new monies without a reputation
or a record, and to assess the costs and be:nefits of trading in domestie
money or in hard currency. Resolution of the uncertainties that Iead to
highcr transactions costs will depend, as always, on fiscal developments,
bccausc thcrc ncvcr will be a stable monctary policy without a sustainable
fiscal policy.
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